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Abstract
We study the infinite horizon emissions and stock of pollution choices of time-inconsistent
individuals by incorporating the stochastic hyperbolic preferences of Harris and Laibson
(2013), later extended by Zou et al. (2014), into the environmental dynamic game pro-
posed by Jørgensen et al. (2003) with linear-state structure. We derive analytic solutions
for optimal emissions and stock of pollution selections for sophisticated individuals and
extend the results with a sensitivity analysis of the stochastic hyperbolic parameters and
their impact on the economy. Compared to the results of Jørgensen et al., we find that
the stochastic hyperbolic discounting model increases the emissions rates and the stock of
pollution, concretely, in the case in which agents are highly impatient.
Keywords: Stochastic hyperbolic discounting, time-inconsistency, infinite lifetime, dy-
namic games, environmental economies, cooperation, sophisticated agent.
1 Introduction
Economic decisions are, in most cases, of the intertemporal kind and imply trade-offs
between present and future costs and benefits. Since Samuelson (1937), the Discounted
Utility Model, also known as the Exponential Discounted Utility Model with a constant
discount rate, became the mainstream in this framework. However, Strotz (1956) found
that this was the only discount function that lead to time-consistent preferences, i.e., pref-
erences where individuals do not have incentives to change their ex-ante optimal plan
when it is recomputed in the future.
Evidence from psychology and behavioral economics has shown that the inconsis-
tent behavior is common in human time preferences (Thaler, 1981; Thaler and Shefrin,
1981; Ainslie, 1992; Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992; Laibson, 1997; McClure et al., 2004).
Those studies have been evolving rapidly, from Thaler (1981), where the author notices
that individuals are discounting time differently depending, on the length of time, size of
the reward and the sign, i.e., different discounting rates for gains and losses; to Laibson
(1997), who explains how people fight this time-inconsistency by obtaining less liquid as-
sets. More recent studies have shown that some individuals changed their ex-ante choices
when they were asked again in the future and that people are willing to incorporate re-
minders on their portfolio activities to not only do not withdraw their accounts, but also
keep depositing more savings in the future (Havely, 2015; Karlan et al., 2016).
The non-constant discounting models in general and, in particular, the Hyperbolic Dis-
counting, which addresses the evidence by giving different weights to present and future
(β − δ preferences), have become a major topic in intertemporal choice models. Works,
such as Barro (1999), who adapts the classic Ramsey model to the non-constant discount-
ing, or O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), in which the authors show how agents with hy-
perbolic preferences might face self-control issues, are examples of the vast literature
that has been developed. In fact, hyperbolic discounting assumes that the capability to
compute problems, and hence, make distinctions, diminishes for more distant events, as
Thaler (1981) illustrates on his dynamic inconsistency example, which stresses that the
elapse of small periods of time in the long future are nearly irrelevant. This concept is
key when considering long-lived problems of the environment, where the present agents
might feel substantially closer to their children, than to their grandchildren or even further
generations, so that, making current time agents be willing to discount the welfare of next
generations (Karp, 2005).
Three behavior profiles for agents are found in the hyperbolic discounting framework,
which are separated according to their ”consciousness of their inconsistency”. That is,
whether they are aware of their time-inconsistency or not. Naive-agents do not know
about their inconsistency; in which case, they will change their strategies in the future re-
peatedly. The case of precommited-agents considers a scenario in which agents are aware
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of their inconsistent preferences and they can fix a binding contract, prohibiting them from
deviating from their ex-ante choices. Otherwise, if they are aware of this but they cannot
enforce this contract, sophisticated-agents will have completely rational strategies, since
they will advance their future deviations and incorporate this information in the choice
process.
With regards to modelling pollution problems, three characteristics must be consid-
ered: interdependence, when the actions of individuals do not only affect their own utility,
but also the utility of other agents; time, since environmental problems are intrinsically
dynamic; strategic behavior, strategies of other agents affect the final output. Jørgensen
et al. (2003) identified agreeability conditions for linear-state differential games in which
time consistency was found, which is necessary to achieve dynamic (intertemporal) in-
dividual rationality. In the case in which each agent’s cooperative payoff dominates her
non-cooperative payoff at any instant of time, the dynamic individual rationality is en-
sured. The authors consider the association between several agents – two countries –
which have to ratify a cooperation agreement to control of the transboundary pollution for
infinite periods (T → ∞). This is extended from Petrosjan and Zaccour (2003), in which
they obtain a time-consistent Shapley value allocation for pollution costs in the control,
and earlier transboundary pollution models, such as van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992).
In this paper, we study the intertemporal emissions rules and stock of pollution for
economies, which pollute as a consequence of the production of consumption goods, fo-
cusing on sophisticated individuals with time-inconsistent preferences and an infinite life-
time. Almost all existing studies on intertemporal pollution problems assume the scenario
of the classical exponential discounted utility model. By considering hyperbolic discount-
ing, one country can be seen as the sum of infinite future different countries, in which case,
we address also the problem of “internal” time-inconsistency. We contribute to the existing
literature by incorporating the model of stochastic hyperbolic discounting, developed by
Harris and Laibson (2013) and extended by Zou et al. (2014), into the differential game for
pollutant economies developed by Jørgensen et al. (2003). We find time-consistent poli-
cies for three different cases: single-agent case and, for two countries, the non-cooperative
(Nash) and cooperative cases. By comparing with the results of Jørgensen et al. (2003),
we find that emissions rates and stocks of pollution increase when the discount function is
described by stochastic hyperbolic discounting.
Our paper complements the study by showing several approximations for the two
stochastic hyperbolic discounting preferences’ main parameters. We compare how emis-
sions rates and pollution stocks evolve for the three different agent’s cases, considering
different time preferences: the standard case (exponential discounting utility model), the
Instantaneous Gratification (IG) case (Harris and Laibson, 2013) and intermediate cases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews stochastic hyperbolic
discounting and the pollution differential game. Section 3 introduces the basic model,
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which incorporates stochastic hyperbolic discounting into the pollution differential game,
setting a general model for n-agents. Section 4 describes and solves the dynamic pro-
gramming equations for the three particular cases. Section 5 presents and discusses the
sensitivity analysis for the stochastic hyperbolic discounting parameters. Section 6 con-
cludes and the appendices provide all the technical computations.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we first introduce the modeling framework of Jørgesen et al. (2003) for
pollutant economies. After this, we discuss the literature regarding the stochastic hyper-
bolic discounting preferences of Harris and Laibson (2013) and how Zou et al. (2014)
incorporate this in their model.
2.1 Emissions and stock of pollution
We consider the scenario of two countries, which are subjected to pollution if they want to
produce consumption goods, and their polluting emissions are accumulating in a common
transboundary stock of pollution, e.g., (van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw, 1992). In addition
to this, due to the nature of the stochastic hyperbolic discounting, we also consider the
simplest case for one country, which sees the individual decision making as a dynamic
game between the same agent in different points of time. Each country suffers welfare
damage from the transboundary stock of pollution and produces a single consumption
good Qi. The production of such consumption good implies the emission of Xi pollution
units, where Xi = εQi. The parameter ε gives the ratio of emissions per output unit. For
simplicity and without loss of generality we suppose ε = 1.





ωiXi(s)− δP (s), P (t) = Pt ≥ 0, (1)
where emissions Xi are transformed by a positive parameter ωi into stock of pollution,
which can be seen as environmental-oriented technology of country i, δ is the natural
absorption rate and Pt is the value of the stock at the moment of the computation.
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The welfare function is divided into two parts. On the one hand, instantaneous benefits
from consumption for country i come from an increasing and concave function Ui(Qi). On
the other hand, an increasing and convex function Di(P ) incorporates the damage dealt
by pollution. Hence, the welfare function for country i is described by
Wi(Qi, P ) = Ui(Qi)−Di(P ) .
Given that ε = 1 and the relation between output and emissions, country’s i aim is to find
the emissions control strategy Xi(s) which maximizes the welfare function subject to the
stock of pollution motion, equation (1). Therefore, the dynamic problem for each country









ωiXi − δP, P (t) = Pt, i = 1, 2, ..., n ;
with a state variable P (s) - the stock of pollution - and each player’s control variable
Xi, i.e., pollutant emissions. In addition, ρ is a constant time discount rate. It might be
interpreted to be equal to the risk-free interest rate.
Owing to the specifications from Jørgensen et al. (2003) for tractable differential games
where, due to stationarity, the equilibrium strategies and the value functions do not depend
explicitly on time, the particular functional forms for Ui(Xi) andDi(P ) for the linear-state
differential game are
Ui(Xi) = γi ln(αiXi), Di(P ) = ϕiP, γi, αi, ϕi > 0, (2)
where γi and αi are parameters which represent country’s i overall technology, and ϕi is a
parameter that reflects the socio-economic sensibility and/or a direct damage to humans’
health.
2.2 Stochastic hyperbolic discounting
Zou et al. (2014) aimed to study the consumption and portfolio problem of an individual
with time-inconsistent preferences. They incorporated the stochastic hyperbolic discount-
ing function of Harris and Laibson (2013) into Merton’s classical framework (1969, 1971).
Moreover, to obtain a time-consistent policy, the authors used the procedure followed by
Marı́n-Solano and Navas (2009, 2010), converting the continuous time problem into a
discrete time setting and solving it by backward induction. To do so, they obtained the
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agent’s last future self optimal actions and then, by iteration and passing to the continuous
time limit, they were able to find the dynamic programming equation for the sophisticated
individual.
Based on Harris and Laibson (2013), the discount interval was divided into two subin-
tervals: present and future. The present benefits were discounted exponentially with a con-
stant discount rate ρ, whereas future benefits are further discounted by a factor β, where
0 < β ≤ 1, which epitomizes the agent’s bias to the present or impatience. According to
that, the discount function θ(t, s) is expressed as
θ(t, s) =
{
e−ρ(s−t), s ∈ [t, t+ τ),
βe−ρ(s−t), s ∈ [t+ τ,∞), (3)
where [t, t + τ) is the present interval and [t + τ,∞) is the future interval. The stochas-
tic hyperbolic discounting function θ(t, s) satisfies stationarity by definition, which means
that θ(t, t + s) = θ(0, s). The present interval duration τ will be stochastic and exponen-
tially distributed by a hazard rate parameter λ, with the expected duration E[τ ] = 1/λ. It
implies that, the smaller λ is, the larger is the expected duration of the present interval τ .
Interestingly, when λ = 0, the present interval’s duration τ is equal to∞, so that the prob-
lem becomes the general case of an exponential with a constant discount rate ρ. A similar
result is provided by the case where β = 1, therefore, the value of λ is irrelevant. In the
case in which λ→∞, τ will be equal to 0, accordingly, the discount function becomes an
Instantaneous Gratification (IG) discounting function
θ(t, s) =
{
1, s = t,
βe−ρ(s−t), s ∈ (t,∞),
in which the stochastic discount function is a deterministic jump function with a jump at t.
Otherwise, when 0 < λ <∞, the problem becomes an interesting intermediate and more
realistic case which allows us to make a sensitivity analysis.
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3 Basic Model
In this section, we merge both settings previously discussed. We first set the stochastic
hyperbolic discounting into the pollution linear-state differential game for n-agents. After
that, we write the dynamic programming equation derived by Zou et al. (2014), for our
setting. Finally, we discuss the proposed value functions for such differential game.
Considering now the nature of the stochastic hyperbolic discounting function θ(t, s),
the dynamic problem for each country at time t have to be separated in two subintervals.
Taking into account that each country i can be experiencing a different value for λ, we must
pay heed to E[τi] = 1/λi. Given these circumstances, we adapt the dynamic problem to






e−ρ(s−t)Wi(Xi, P ) ds+ β
∫ ∞
t+τi






ωiXi − δP, P (t) = Pt , i = 1, 2, ..., n . (5)
Now, to obtain time-consistent policies, sophisticated agents with inconsistent prefer-
ences consider their future selves’ preferences at their current decision making problem.
By building the dynamic programming equation for sophisticated individuals, Zou et al.
(2014) were allowed to find such policies and delete the uncertainty, giving an exact value
for each country’s τi. They computed the problem for value functions Vi, independent of
time s, only depending on the current conditions of the state variable P. Therefore, our
dynamic programming equation is articulated by
ρVi(P ) +Ki(P ) = max
Xi≥0
[
Wi(Xi, P ) + V
′











i , P ) ds, i = 1, 2, ..., n . (7)
Note that equation (6) must be computed for every agent, in which case it becomes a
system of dynamic programming equations. Denoted by Vi(P ) we have the value function
for player i, with its derivative with respect to P , V ′i (P ). Such derived value function
multiplies the function g(Xi, P ), which describes the equation of motion Ṗ , dP/dt =
Ṗ = g(Xi, P ).
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After maximizing the right hand side of equation (6) and substitute it inside equation (7),
we will be able to split equation (6) into terms which multiply P(t) and otherwise, allowing
us to find the consistent results. Notably, when λi = 0 or βi = 1, i.e., the general case, the
right hand side of equation (7) also becomes equal to 0.
Our guessing for the value functions Vi(P ) are the same as Jørgensen et al. (2003)
proposed, since the form of the welfare functions Wi(Xi, P ) is also the same. According
to this, the following expression denotes our proposed value functions for n countries
Vi (P ) = AiP +Bi , i = 1, 2, ... , n; (8)
deriving with respect to P ,
V
′
i (P ) = Ai , i = 1, 2, ... , n; (9)
where Ai and Bi are functions which are assumed to be independent on time s. Notably,
due to our studied functional forms, neither the efficient emissions Xi, nor the stock of
pollution trajectory P (s), depend on Bi.
4 Time-consistent policies
Our analysis is focused on three different cases. We first discuss and solve the single-agent
problem, which allows us to generate general conclusions for problems of this kind, and
also to generate graphs which are highly useful for Section 5. After that, we discuss and
solve the non-cooperative and cooperative cases for two players, enabling us to analyze
and make comparisons between them.
4.1 Single-agent case
In the single-agent case, the economy is described by a unique country, which does not
need to take into account other countries’ emissions on the stock of pollution. Under
the assumption of standard discounting, considering the single-agent case would of be
poor relevance. However, such country must take into account its future country selves’
preferences in its current decision-making. The more such country pollutes today, the
less it might be able to pollute in the future to remain in the same stock of pollution.
Now, adjusting equations (4-5) to the single-agent case and our particular functional form
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from equation (2), γ ln(αX) − ϕP , the dynamic net payoff of emissions problem to be


















s.t. Ṗ = ωX − δP, P (t) = Pt. (11)
Thus, following the procedure for the sophisticated agent with stochastic hyperbolic dis-
counting, the dynamic programming equation to be solved is

















We enclose all the calculations for the single agent case in the Appendix A with the aim
of making the reading easier and comfortable.
By maximizing the right hand side of the equation (12) we find that the optimal emis-
sions rule, equation (14), does not depend directly on time, but depends on A, i.e., the
derivative of our proposed value function, equation (9). Then,




















Note that Ω does not depend on time, which coincides with our previous assumption,
making A constant in terms of time s. Such Ω has to be seen as the connector between λ
cases. In the case in which λ = 0 or β = 1, the standard case, the whole term Ω becomes
equal to 0, leaving the same result as in the standard case. Then, if λ→∞, known as the
Instantaneous Gratification (IG) case, Ω will be reduced to 1− β. Otherwise, it allows the
parameters ρ and δ to have an impact through Ω.
Proposition 1. Using the sophisticated agent procedure with time-inconsistent prefer-
ences, we find the following time-consistent and constant emissions rate and stock of
pollution trajectory.
The time-consistent emissions rule follows as
X∗ = − γ(ρ+ δ)
ωϕ[Ω− 1]
. (16)
Note that in the standard case λ = 0 so that, Ω equal to 0, the optimal emissions rule X∗
is positive. Also for the Instantaneous Gratification (IG) case λ → ∞, thus, Ω equal to
1− β, the optimal emissions rule is positive and larger due to 0 < β ≤ 1.















which in case λ = 0, the multipliers cancel and we obtain the standard case, i.e., exponen-











Interestingly, for the instantaneous gratification case, instead of cancelling the multipliers
from equation (17), they become 1/β, increasing the term (ρ+δ)γ
δϕ
. Such behaviors are
illustrated in figure (4) in Section 5.
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4.2 Non-cooperative case (Nash equilibrium)
For the non-cooperative agents case, each country will maximize its own objective Jnci
taking into account the emissions rules of the other player. Hence, the following dynamic
net payoff functions to be maximized for non-cooperative agents with functional forms of



















s.t. Ṗ = ω1X1 + ω2X2 − δP ; P (t) = Pt, i = 1, 2. (19)
Even though they only maximize their own function, i.e., inside Jnci only appears the
i-agent’s parameters, the stock of pollution shows the impact of having two polluting
countries in the market. Note that we allow τi, the length of the current period, for the
possibility to be different for each country, since they are computing their own Jnci , which
implies that they might be experiencing a different λ1, λ2.
Again, under the standard procedure, we build the following dynamic programming
equation for non-cooperative sophisticated individuals




















ds, i = 1, 2. (21)
We obtain a system of equations, one for each country. In such system we need find two
different but with the same form value functions V nci , with its respective derivative V
nc′
i .




After the calculations enclosed in Appendix B, we find the non-cooperative Xnc∗i , A
nc
i and
Ωi. Note that we do not focus on solving Bnci in this paper, since it does not affect to
the optimal emissions rule, nor the stock of pollution, in our linear-state differential game.




















with the following Ωi terms, one for each country i
Ωi =
λi(1− βi)
λi + ρ+ δ
. (23)
For the non-cooperative case, we find two different Ωi, which depend not only on the
common and fixed parameters ρ and δ, but also on the stochastic hyperbolic ones λi and
βi. Further, the two non-cooperative Ωi affect in a very similar way as in the single-agent’s
Ω. Hence, for λi = 0 or βi = 1, Ωi cancels, and for λi → ∞, the whole term becomes
1− βi.
Proposition 2. Using the sophisticated agent procedure we find the following Nash-
equilibria constant emissions rule and pollution stock trajectory.





which are always positive due to the form of equation (23). No matter the values calibrated
for parameters λi, βi, ρ and δ, the value of Ωi is always between [0, 1), which cancels the
minus multiplier of equation (24). Note that λi ∈ [0,∞), βi ∈ [0, 1] and λi + ρ + δ ≥ 0.
So that, λi(1− βi) < λi + ρ+ δ.
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In a similar way to the single-agent case, if λi = 0, the term Ωi will become 0, and we get





















For the instantaneous gratification discounting, a similar result to the above equation is
found. With the addition of βi to the denominator, the multiplier becomes: γiϕiβi , which
increases the stock of pollution, P (s), a lot when s→∞.
4.3 Cooperative case
In the cooperative game, both countries joint their individual functions Ji to maximize
the sum of them J c as one. It is reasonable to assume that they agree on their stochastic
hyperbolic parameters, such the duration of the present interval τ exponentially distributed
by a common λ. Even though they might face a different bias to the present βi, we also
assume they agree on a single β to avoid future extra deviations. In addition to the previous
presented models, for the cooperative case each country has to be weighted by µi, where
0 ≤ µi ≤ 1, so that we can consider differences between countries. It is noteworthy to
mention that countries in this setting are willing to cooperate due to the higher total output





i ) ≤ J c for many cases of µi.
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Therefore, the joint dynamic net payoff function to be maximized for cooperative agents
with functional forms of the kind of equation (2) is characterized by






















s.t. Ṗ = ω1X1 + ω2X2 − δP, P (t) = Pt. (27)
Note that the dynamics of the stock of pollution are the same for non-cooperative and
cooperative cases.
Following the same procedure as in the previous two cases, we describe the dynamic
programming equation for cooperative agents with stochastic hyperbolic discounting. In
this case, we have a single proposed cooperative value function V c, which is the sum of
two smaller V c1 and V
c
2 . In which case the dynamic programming equation is



























The single-agent’s case and the cooperative one are very similar. Thus, the joint net pay-






fills the same room as the net
payoff function of the single-agent’s case W (X,P ) in the dynamic programming equa-
tion. Nonetheless, the equation of motion, function g(X1, X2, P ), is equal to the non-
cooperative case one, since countries accumulate emissions in the stock in the same way.
We also enclose all the calculations for the cooperative case in the Appendix C. We get
two different emissions rules, one for each country, that depend to the common Ac, which




























Again, the Ω term is always postive, no matter the values of its parameters, so as in previ-
ous cases.
Proposition 3. Using the sophisticated agent procedure we find the following time-
consistent cooperative constant emissions rates, which only depends on each agent pa-
rameters, and time-consistent pollution stock trajectory.









The form of the emissions rules for the cooperative case are almost even to the non-
cooperative one form, but for the sum of the parameters ϕi and the selected weights. In
fact, in case those weights are equal to 1, µ1 = µ2 = 1, and also the parameters ϕi are
equal, ϕ1 = ϕ2, the optimal emissions Xci are the half of X
nc
i .









































In this section, we complement our previous results with a sensitivity analysis of the
stochastic hyperbolic discounting parameters (β − λ) and discuss other parameters such
as (γ−ω). We first analyze the impact of such parameters to the optimum emissions rules
for our three particular cases: single-agent, non-cooperative and cooperative. After doing
so, we also analyze the effect of those parameters on the time-consistent stock of pollu-
tion trajectory. Moreover, we discuss the limits of our analysis and proposals for future
research in the field.
We are interested in comparing the impact of λ for given values of β. To compute so,
we follow the calibration for the stochastic hyperbolic parameters proposed by Zou et al.
(2014), plus the calibration for scale economy parameters proposed by Jørgensen et al.
(2003). Hence, the chosen values for the parameters are the following:
ρ = 0.046, β ∈ [0, 1], λ ∈ [0,∞), γ = (0.3, 0.4, 0.5, ), α = 1, ϕ = 0.2,
ω = (0.2, 0.35), δ = 0.3, µ1 = µ2 = 1;
where, we present four different cases of values of λ; we first discuss β and then we focus
of its extreme cases; we compare whether the effects of having higher values of γ are
similar to the experienced by having lower values of ω; and we set the weights of the
two countries equal to 1, which allows us to compare the non-cooperative and cooperative
frameworks.
5.1 Time-consistent emissions
Firstly, we examine how emissions evolve when the single-agent faces four different values
of λ. Those emissions are constant with respect to time s, thus, we display their behavior
when the parameter β changes. Doing so, we are able to distinguish and focus on the
most important issues, regarding to the impact of λ, when discussing the emissions for
non-cooperative and cooperative agents. The four λ different are displayed by (red, black,
blue, green) normal lines.
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Figure 1 shows that, when the single-agent faces a standard problem, λ = 0, the value of β
does not affect emissions at all. It also shows that the case in which β → 1, the impact of
the chosen λ is negligible. In the case in which β is close to 0, which means that the agent
is highly impatient, special attention must be focused on the instantaneous gratification
case, in which time-consistent emissions are much higher than in any other case.
Figure 1: Impact of β and λ on X∗
We analyze now how, given the same values for λ and β, an increase in γ, which represents
the single country’s overall technology, has a similar impact on emissions as a decrease
in ω, i.e., the single country’s environmental-oriented technology. This is highly impor-
tant for our non-cooperative and cooperative analysis, since ω does not affect the stock
of pollution, which we study in the following subsection, due to the form of our studied
linear-state differential game. Interestingly, for future research, a linear-quadratic differ-
ential game could solve this feature, since in Jørgensen et al. (2005) the authors show how
the stock of pollution is affected by ω in a problem with standard discounting.
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Figure 2 clearly shows that an increase in γ has a similar impact to a decrease in ω. Hence,
we use different values of γ for countries 1 and 2 when analyzing the problem for non-
cooperative and cooperative, as a proxy of the impact of different values of ω, the environ-
mental technology.
Figure 2: Sensitivity of ω and γ
We next show how emissions evolve for two different countries γ = (0.5, 0.4) when fac-
ing the problem in the non-cooperative and cooperative way. We observe that for those
countries with a higher value of γ, which can be interpreted as having a lower value of
ω, i.e., less environmental-oriented technology, it is more worthy to have high emissions
rates.
Figure 3 shows that, given both countries’ weights are equal to one, the non-cooperative
agents (red) are polluting twice as much as their respective cooperative agents (blue). This
result is relatively insignificant when β → 1. However, in the case in which β → 0, dou-
bling the emissions might be a serious issue. Moreover, there are also differences between
those with higher and lower environmental-oriented technology as shown by dashed and
normal lines respectively.
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Figure 3: Cooperative vs Non-cooperative emissions
5.2 Time-consistent stock of pollution
We now analyze whether different values of λ have an impact on the stock of pollution
when the parameter β is fixed. As we have observed in the previous subsection, the two
most notable cases are when β is equal to 0 and 1. Thus, we build a two-graph figure which
illustrates how time and λ affect the stock in these two particular cases for the single-agent
economy.
Figure 4 shows the cases for a patient (blue) and an impatient (red) economy. It is clear
that, the value of λ is not important if the economy is highly patient, i.e., β = 0.9. In fact,
if we set β = 1, all four curves will be exactly the same. The case in which the economy
is highly impatient β = 0.2, however, is more interesting. We observe big differences in
the stock of pollution curves for our four different cases, in particular between the two
extreme cases, but also on the intermediate ones.
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Figure 4: Impact of β and λ on the stock of pollution
Under these results, our last graph aims to study the dynamics of the cooperative and non-
cooperative economies with a fixed high value for impatience, and the two most extreme
cases for λ, standard and instantaneous gratification cases. We set the non-cooperative and
20
cooperative economies cases in red and blue respectively, and separate them according to
standard and instantaneous gratification as shown by the dashed and normal lines respec-
tively. We also set γ1 = 0.5 and γ2 = 0.4 to illustrate the effect when those two countries
have different technologies.
Figure 5 shows that, given a low value of β, the cases in which λ = 0 or λ → ∞
have much higher effect, than the impact generated by cooperation or non-cooperation.
Nonetheless, in a the same way as on Figure 3, the non-cooperative stock of pollution is at
all times double that of the cooperative stock, which could imply severe consequences for
those economies which are not willing to cooperate.
Figure 5: Cooperative vs Non-cooperative stock of pollution
Our results suggest that different values of λ imply very different outputs, and have a very
important effect on the economy, mainly in the cases where β is low. Thus, economies
should make the effort to track and calibrate their respective value of β1 as well as the
values of other regions βi, i = 2, ..., n, which also have an indirect effect on them. In
addition, a properly weighting µi is needed in order to study the real difference between




We have computed the sophisticated-agent solution with stochastic hyperbolic discount-
ing in infinite time horizon for a single-agent case, two non-cooperative agents case and
two cooperative agents case, as an extension of Harris and Laibson (2013) and Zou et
al. (2014). We have contributed to such existing literature by introducing this kind of
discounting into the framework of dynamic games of the environment, such as Jørgensen
et al. (2003). In addition, an exhaustive sensitivity analysis of the stochastic hyperbolic
parameters has been conducted.
The discussion of this work might be useful for policy implementation towards trans-
boundary pollution agreements between countries. Notwithstanding, future research should
consider more representative payoff functions, such as the linear-quadratic function, which
possibly, would have allowed emissions to be dependant with respect to time.
In all three studied cases, the parameter representing impatient behavior was trascen-
dental, so that tracking and, perhaps, imposing restrictions to such parameter in real
economies could be important to assure environmental quality in the long run. Further-
more, tracking the hazard rate by which economies’ present interval is distributed, would
be of a high interest.
On the one hand, we find that the time-consistent emission policies are constant and
independent of time, only depending on the chosen scale parameters, although this result
may change for other payoff functions. On the other hand, the time-consistent stock of
pollution for all cases is an exponential function that can be highly impacted in some
situations, such as the instantaneous gratification case. In addition, we find that, at all
cases, non-cooperative agents pollute double that of equally to one weighted cooperative
agents.
From our study, there is plenty room for extensions and improvements in new research.
For instance, considering more realistic payoff functions, country agreements by incentive
strategies or computing the precommitted-agent and naive-agent solutions.
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Appendix A
Since for the single-agent case, the proposed value function is V = AP + B, and its
derivative V ′ = A, by maximizing the right hand side of the dynamic programming equa-








ω V ′(P )
,
X∗ = − γ
ω A
. (A.1)
To find the time-consistent state of the stock of pollution we integrate the law of motion of
pollution
Ṗ = ωX∗ − δP ;
Ṗ + δP = ωX∗ = ω(− γ
ω A
) .
The above first-order differential equation can be solved by the integrating factor method.
Thus, we multiply the whole thing by eδτ and integrate from t to s
∫ s
t

























Let Υ(s, t) be:







eδsP (s) = P (t) eδt + Υ(s, t) ,
P (s) =
[








































Using equation (A.3), and replacing it into K(P ) - equation (13) - we are able to write all
P in function of actual time t instead of s, which also allows split equation (A.4). Hence,







































We use the above expression and replace it into the Dynamic programming equation
(DPE), K(P ) together with V (P ) and V ′. Further, we do not have to replace X∗ by
− γ
ωA
yet, since P does not appear explicitly inside X∗. Thus,













γ ln(αX∗)− ϕΥ(s, t) e−δs
)
ds
= γ ln(αX∗)− ϕPt + ωAX∗ − δAPt ; (A.4)
where we suppose A constant and with the same value for all Pt. Under this assumption,
we focus now in all terms from equation (A.4) multiplied by Pt to find A:







ds = −ϕPt − δAPt .




e−(λ+ρ+δ)(s−t)ds = −ϕ− δA ,






































We find in equation (A.5) a constant solution for A, which will depend only on the scale
parameters and on selected (λ, β).
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Now, we replace A from equation (A.5) into equation (A.1), allowing us to find the effi-
cient emissions rate X∗. Which is





= − γ(ρ+ δ)
ω ϕ [Ω− 1]
. (A.6)






































we leave the term −1
Ω−1 separated because it is equal to 1 for the general case when λ =














Our proposal for the value functions for non-cooperative agents are: Anci P + B
nc
i for
i = 1, 2. According to that, by maximizing the right hand side of dynamic programming















, i = 1, 2. (B.1)
To find the time-consistent state of the stock of pollution we compute the problem for the





2 − δP ;
















The above first-order differential equation can be solved by the integrating factor method.
Thus, we multiply the whole thing by eδτ and integrate from t to s
∫ s
t



































Let Υnc(s, t) be:









Thus, we compute the time s stock of pollution using the equation (B.2),
P (s) eδs = P (t) eδt + Υnc(s, t) ,
P (s) =
[














































Using equation (B.3), and replacing it into Ki(P ), equation (21), we are able to write all
P in function of actual time t instead of s, which also allows split equation (B.4) and find
Anci , equation (B.5)













































We will use the above expression and replace it into the DPE, Ki(P ) together with Vi(P )
and V ′i . Further, we do not have to replace X
∗
i by − γiωiAnci yet, since it does not depend on
P .

























i )− δAnci Pt .Thus, (B.4)
We suppose Anci constant and with the same value for all Pt. We focus now in all the terms
multiplied by Pt to find Anci ,







ds = −ϕiPt − δAnci Pt ,
we collect all Pt terms,
ρAnci − λi(1− βi)ϕi
∫ ∞
t
e−(λi+ρ+δ)(s−t)ds = −ϕi − δAnci ,
ρAnci + δA
nc









































We find in equation (B.5) a constant solution for Anci , which will depend only on the scale
parameters and on the selected λi.
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· [Ωi − 1]
,
= − γi(ρ+ δ)
ωi ϕi [Ωi − 1]
. (B.6)























































We leave the term −1
Ωi−1 separated because it is equal to 1 for the standard case when





















By maximizing the right hand side of dynamic programming equation (29) with respect to





















2 − δP ;
















The above first-order differential equation can be solved by the integrating factor method.
Thus, we multiply the whole thing by eδτ and integrate from t to s
∫ s
t




































Let Υc(s, t) be:









Hence, using equation (C.2) inside P (s) we build the stock of pollution trajectory
P (s) eδs = P (t) eδt + Υc(s, t) ,
P (s) =
[


























































Using equation (C.3) and replacing it into Kc(P ), equation (29), we are able to write all
P in function of actual time t instead of s, which also allows us to split equation (C.4) and,
so that, obtain equation (C.5). Thus,





















































We use the above expression and replace it into the dynamic programming equationKc(P )
together with V c(P ) and V c′ . Further, we do not have to replace Xci by − µiγiωiAc yet, since it
does not depend on P . Given this,































i )− δAcPt . (C.4)
We suppose Ac constant and with the same value for all Pt. Under this assumption, we
focus now in all the terms multiplied by Pt to find Ac












µiϕiPt − δAcPt ,
collect all Pt terms and solve for Ac,








































































where we find a constant solution for Ac, which will depend only on the scale parameters
and on the selected λ.






















, i = 1, 2. (C.6)













































where we leave the term −1
Ω−1 separated because it is equal to 1 when, λ = 0 → Ω = 0.






















Ainslie, G. and N. Haslam, 1992. Hyperbolic discounting. Choice Over Time, Russell
Sage, New York.
Barro, R. J., 1999. Ramsey meets Laibson in the neoclassical growth model. The Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 114 (4): 1125 – 1152.
Dockner, E. and N. Van Long, 1993. International pollution control: Cooperative versus
non-cooperative strategies. Journal of Environmental and Management 24: 13 – 29.
Harris, C. and D. Laibson, 2013. Instantaneous Gratification. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 1999: 205 – 248.
Havely, Y., 2015. Time Consistency: Stationarity and Time Invariance. Econometrica 83
(1): 335 – 352.
Jørgensen, S., Martı́n-Herrán, G. and G. Zaccour, 2003. Agreeability and time consistency
in linear-state differential games. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 119
(1): 31 – 39.
Jørgensen, S., Martı́n-Herrán, G. and G. Zaccour, 2005. Sustainability of cooperation over
time in linear-quadratic differential games. International Game Theory Review 7 (4): 395
- 406.
Karlan, D., McConnell, M., Mullainathan, S. and J. Zinnan, 2016. Getting to the top of
Mind: How Reminders Increase Saving. Management Science 2016: 3393 – 3411.
Karp, L., 2005. Global warming and hyperbolic discounting. Journal of Public Economics
89: 261 - 282.
Laibson, D., 1997. Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 112 (2): 443 – 477.
Loewenstein, G. F. and D. Prelec, 1992. Anomalies in Intertemporal choice: Evidence and
an interpretation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (2): 573 – 597.
Marı́n-Solano, J. and J. Navas, 2009. Non-constant discounting in finite horizon: the
terminal time case. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 33 (3): 666 – 675.
Marı́n-Solano, J. and J. Navas, 2010. Consumption and portfolio rules for time-inconsistent
investors. European Journal of Operational Research 201 (3): 860 – 872.
35
McClure, S. M., Laibson, D., Lowenstein, G. and J.D. Cohen, 2004. Separate neutral
systems value immediate and delayed monetary rewards. Science 306 (5695): 503 – 507.
Merton, R. C., 1969. Lifetime portfolio selection under uncertainty: the continuous-time
case. The review of Economics and Statistics 51 (3): 247 – 257.
Merton, R. C., 1971. Optimum consumption and portfolio rules in a continuous-time
model. Journal of Economic Theory 3 (4): 373 – 413.
O’Donoghue, T and M. Rabin, 1999. Doing It Now or Later. The American Economic
Review 103 – 124.
Petrosjan, L. A. and G. Zaccour, 2003. Time-consistent Shapley value of pollution cost
reduction. Journal of Economics Dynamics and Control 27 (3): 381 – 398.
Samuelson, P.A., 1937. A Note on Measurement of Utility. The Review of Economic
Studies 4 (2): 155 – 161.
Strotz, R. H., 1956. Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization. The
Review of Economic Studies 23 (3): 165 – 180.
Thaler, R. H., 1981. Some empirical evidence on dynamic inconsistency. Economic Let-
ters 8: 201 – 207.
Thaler, R. H. and H. M. Shefrin, 1981. An Economic Theory of Self-Control. Journal of
Political Economy 89(2): 392 – 406.
van der Ploeg, F. and A. de Zeeuw, 1992. International aspects of pollution control. Envi-
ronmental and Resource Economics 2 (2): 117 – 139.
Zou, Z., Chen, S. and L. Wedge, 2014. Finite horizon consumption and portfolio decisions
with stochastic hyperbolic discounting. Journal of Mathematical Economics 52: 70 – 80.
36
